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ABSTRACT: Is formal logic a failure? It may be, if we accept the context-independent limits imposed by 
Russell, Frege, and others. In response to difficulties arising from such limitations I present a Toulmin-
esque social recontextualization of formal logic. The results of my project provide a positive view of formal 
logic as a success while simultaneously reaffirming the social and contextual concerns of argumentation 
theorists, critical thinking scholars, and rhetoricians. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Is formal logic a failure? If we judge the success of formal logic using criteria that are 
imposed and evaluated from within that very field of inquiry, it seems that we are likely 
to run into a number of difficulties. The aspirations of logicians have traditionally been 
lofty, and their methods for achieving their many goals have typically been austere. Logi-
cians have developed systems that serve their attempts to transcend context, and to reach 
towards the unchanging and eternal. The nature of the goals and methods of logicians 
tend to obviate the consideration of formal logic as a social or historical entity. But de-
velopments in anthropology, sociology, and history—as well as work in new fields such 
as argumentation theory and critical thinking—may demonstrate a value in placing in-
creased emphasis on those social and historical details that are normally considered ir-
relevant in accounts of the development of logic (e.g. Kneale & Kneale 1962). If we 
abandon attempts to offer context-independent evaluations and begin to consider the his-
tory of formal logic in light of contextual concerns, it becomes possible to see—and more 
importantly, to describe—logic as a success. To this end we will begin by investigating 
some of the origins of formal logic in the 1600s, when logic held promise as an endeav-
our of social utility. We will then investigate the deterioration of social concerns within 
the field of logic during the 1879-1931 period, address the all-too-common view of logic 
as a ‘failure’, and conclude by seeing how the work of this period can be regarded as a 
success when social factors are reintroduced.  
2. LEIBNIZ AND HIS INFLUENCE 
Toulmin (1989: 98-103) makes a compelling case for Leibniz’s development of a charac-
teristica universalis and calculus ratiocinator as a socially motivated activity. As evi-
denced by many of the some 15,000 or more letters written during his lifetime, Leibniz 
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was deeply troubled by the religious, economic, and political disputes of his day. While it 
is possible to consider Leibniz and his contributions to logic in a relatively ahistorical 
fashion, Toulmin argues that it is more sensible to see Leibniz as a “German intellectual 
who accepted his responsibility to do whatever he could do to remedy the situation of 
Europe in his time” (1989: 103). Leibniz makes clear reference to the resolution of real-
world disputes when proposing his universal calculus: 
Whenever controversies arise, there will be no more need for arguing among two philoso-
phers than among two mathematicians. For it will suffice to take the pens into the hand and to 
sit down by the abacus, saying to each other (and if they wish also to a friend called for help): 
Let us calculate. (in Gabbay & Woods 2004: 1) 
Properly formalized, details from philosophical, political, economic, and religious dis-
putes could be fed into a calculating system. Such a system would be supported by the 
establishment of a global standard of communication, and would not only serve as a tool 
of dispute resolution, but also as a universal solution to the barriers of language. 
 Leibniz’s proposed system may exhibit a “characteristic blend of genius and in-
sanity” (Coffa 1993: 14), but the influence of this idea in the development of logic has been 
immense. In 1882, Ernst Schröeder became involved in a journal dispute with Gottlob Fre-
ge, who alleged that Schröeder had misunderstood the purpose of the Begriffsschrift. Frege 
attempted to clarify this by responding: “I was trying, in fact, to create a ‘lingua character-
istica’ in the Leibnizian sense” (1968: 89). Soon thereafter, Peano and his followers took 
up the habit of recalling Leibniz’s “project of creating a universal script ... in the opening 
sentences of their general writings on logic” (Grattan-Guinness 2001: 237). Bertrand Rus-
sell—himself a notable Leibniz scholar—also wrote that “Leibniz foresaw the science 
which Peano has perfected ... Leibniz’s dream has become fact” (1901; 1918: 79). The in-
fluences of Leibniz, Frege, and Peano eventually saw Russell, along with Alfred North 
Whitehead, produce that great project of formal logic, the Principia Mathematica.  
3. THE DEPARTURE OF THE SOCIAL 
Leibniz had a definite influence on Frege’s logic. Frege’s Begriffsschrift was “influenced 
by two of Leibniz’s ideas: a calculus ratiocinator (a formal calculus of reasoning) and a 
lingua characteristica (a universal language)” (Moore, in Aspray & Kitcher 1988: 102). 
According to Eike-Henner Kluge, the logical projects of Leibniz and Frege share “such 
extensive and close correspondence on so many central issues that the hypothesis of a 
fundamental influence on the part of Leibniz [is] very difficult to deny” (1980: 154). De-
spite similarities, Leibniz’s social motivations for his characteristica were not carried 
forward by Frege. In the preface to his Begriffsschrift, Frege regards Leibniz’s “concep-
tion of a universal characteristic, a calculus philosophicus or ratiocinator, [as] too grandi-
ose for the attempt to realize it to go further than the bare preliminaries” (Heijenoort 
1999: 5). In recognizing the scope and ambition of Leibniz’s project, Frege is also con-
scious that some two centuries have passed since Leibniz first envisioned his ‘dream’. 
Yet Frege does not give up on Leibniz’s project altogether: 
Even if this great aim cannot be achieved at the first attempt, one need not despair of a slow, 
step by step approach. If the problem in its full generality appears insoluble, it has to be lim-
ited provisionally; it can then, perhaps, be dealt with by advancing gradually. Arithmetical, 
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geometrical, and chemical symbols can be regarded as realizations of the Leibnizian concep-
tion in particular fields. The Begriffsschrift offered here adds a new one to these—indeed, the 
one located in the middle, adjoining all the others. (Heijenoort 1999: 6-7) 
Frege can therefore be seen as continuing the work of Leibniz’s project, albeit in a lim-
ited manner. Frege saw clearly that diverse communities of academics such as geometers 
and chemists had produced fragments of Leibnizian systems within their various disci-
plines. Taking care to describe his project as existing alongside, and not above or below 
the piecemeal developments made in other disciplines, Frege plainly does not regard his 
own project as a complete realization of Leibniz’s ‘dream’. He seems encouraged, 
though, that the ‘central location’ of his own decidedly mathematical project might make 
it the most promising path for timely advancement towards Leibniz’s goal.  
 The tremendous advancements made possible by Frege’s work during the fifty 
years following the publication of the Begriffsschrift are testament to the effectiveness of 
this limitation of scope. In particular, Frege’s project paved the way for that two-thousand 
page behemoth rumoured to have arrived at Cambridge University Press in a wheelbar-
row, the Principia Mathematica. While the Principia made great inroads in the logicist 
project, the social concerns of Leibniz were nowhere to be seen. Like Leibniz, Russell 
was deeply concerned with peace. This concern was certainly present following the Boer 
war, and persisted throughout the remainder of Russell’s life. But for Russell, logic had 
become l’art pour l’art. Above all else, the Russell of this period was committed to the 
strictly academic improvement of intellectual discipline and the pursuit of clarity, objec-
tivity, and truth. It seems possible that Russell might have conceived of such goods as 
intrinsic benefits that might stem from study of the Principia. However, Russell is not 
recalled for any insistence that some socially pragmatic value might be attached to his 
efforts in logic, and, most certainly, not in the sense suggested by Leibniz.  
4. GÖDEL: MATHEMATICS AND MISAPPROPRIATION 
The path of advancement that was opened by Frege’s focus on logicism and continued by 
the work of Russell slowed in 1931, when Kurt Gödel presented his incompleteness theo-
rem. The projects of Frege and Russell sought to place mathematics on firm logical foun-
dations, but Gödel’s incompleteness theorem showed that such systems were unable to 
capture all of the “truths of basic arithmetic” (Smith 2007: 122). Among modern academ-
ics, the popular picture that is painted of the 1879-1931 period in formal logic is often 
unfavourable. The rationale for these views seems to arise from a kind of narrative in 
which Frege plays the role of ‘alpha’, while Gödel figures as ‘omega’. For example, Ian 
Hacking characterizes logicism as an “arithmetical revolution [that] failed to take place” 
(2000: 45) and describes the Principia as a project that “did not pan out, for very famous 
reasons, connected with the name of Kurt Gödel” (2000: 45). Similar views are not re-
stricted to philosophers: 
In the Principia [Whitehead and Russell] took up, among other tasks, the project of establish-
ing two theses about logic and mathematics: first, that the disciplines can be complete and, 
second, that they can be consistent. ... The Principia, a logocentric enterprise par excellence, 
seeks to establish the self-sufficiency and integrity of such concepts as identity, contradiction, 
proof, and system. Whitehead and Russell failed in this effort ... it remained to Gödel to show 
them why. (Thomas 1995: 250) 
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Gödel’s result showed that the logical systems of Frege and Russell were incapable of 
providing axiomatic foundations from which the entirety of mathematics could be de-
rived. But quotations such as the preceding make too much of Gödel’s result, and, in so 
doing, run the risk of excessively devaluing the importance of formal logic. Such views 
are not always discouraged by the language use of mathematicians and logicians, who 
have described the impact of Gödel’s result with dramatic adjectives. Michael Friedman 
characterizes Gödel’s theorem as a “fatal blow” (in Aspray & Kitcher 1988: 93) for the 
logical projects of the 1879-1931 period. Similarly, Lindstrom and Palmgren suggest that 
Gödel’s result “shattered” (2010: 19) such projects, while Sinaceur uses the term “de-
stroyed” (2010: 376). The efforts of logicians through the 1879-1931 period have even 
been branded as a quest for the “Holy Grail of logic” (Girle 2003: 192; Hunter 1996: 93); 
in such a narrative, the incompleteness theorem produced by Gödel stands as the central 
obstacle preventing the acquisition of the ‘grail’.  
 To these characterizations we must add the realization that Gödel’s result has 
become the subject of frequent and problematic misappropriations in more popular ven-
ues of discourse. Generally speaking, these troubling examples involve the misapplica-
tion of Gödel’s result to subjects beyond the realm of mathematics. Examples of these 
misuses can be found in philosophy: as early as 1958, William Barrett wrote, “if human 
reason can never reach complete systematization in mathematics, it is not likely to reach 
it anywhere else” (p. 39). In The Postmodern Condition, Jean-François Lyotard sees Gö-
del’s result as necessitating a “reformulation of the question of the legitimation of 
knowledge” (1984: 43). Elsewhere, Gödel’s result has been compared to Zen Buddhist 
kōans (Hofstadter 1980: 246-272), and used to offer an explanation of the nature of hu-
man consciousness (Penrose 1996: 64-126). Each of these examples takes Gödel’s result 
far beyond the realm of mathematics. In a world where Gödel’s result is inexpertly in-
voked in discussions ranging from theology to politics, one academic has even seen fit to 
produce a guide to the use and abuse of Gödel’s theorems. Another introductory philoso-
phy text suggests that people who cite Gödel’s result should be “assumed guilty until 
proven innocent” (Baggini & Fosl 2010: 252). 
5. WHEN ‘FAILURE’ IS SUCCESS 
From a mathematical standpoint, Gödel’s theorem is a particularly valuable result. In and 
of itself, it offers no reason to regard formal logic—or the Principia, as the paradigmatic 
representative of efforts in formal logic—as failures. Indeed, on formal grounds, it seems 
more correct to say that the projects of formal logic are enriched, and not destroyed or 
shattered, by Gödel’s result. B.J. Sokol writes: “in mathematics, a negative conclusion 
has always been as richly interesting as a positive one” (1995: 1054). This positivity has 
been embraced by some writers, who offer logical or mathematical descriptions of the 
impact of Gödel’s result that do not engage in overly dramatic exaggerations: 
There’s an old hope (which goes back to Leibniz) that can be put in modern terms like this: 
we might one day be able to mechanize mathematical reasoning to the point that a suitably 
primed computer could solve all mathematical problems in a domain by deciding theo-
remhood in an appropriate formal theory. What [Gödel has] shown is that this is a false hope. 
(Smith 2007: 45) 
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While the preceding description does not overstep the scope of Gödel’s result, it serves as 
an example of the inaccessibility of logical or mathematical discourse. Regrettably, accu-
rate descriptions of Gödel’s result that are presented by mathematicians and logicians 
seem to fall largely upon deaf ears. When such accounts are compared with the easily 
accessible and hyperbolic alternatives offered by other writers, it is perhaps unsurprising, 
although unfortunate, that Gödel’s result is so widely misunderstood.  
 Understanding formal logic as a socially situated and pragmatically motivated 
activity allows us to generate a semantic alternative to the normal mathematical and logi-
cal explanations for Gödel’s result and its implications for the projects of formal logic. 
This semantic alternative makes use of the vocabulary of argumentation theorists and 
critical thinking scholars, and centres on the idea of viewing formal logic as a socio-
political attempt at dispute resolution and peacemaking. If we invoke Toulmin’s under-
standing of Leibniz as a socially motivated individual who sought a system by which 
peace and understanding could more easily be established, then Gödel’s result should not 
be regarded as the end of the road for Leibniz’s vision, nor as dealing a ‘death blow’ to 
the ‘failed’ projects of formal logic. Rather, what Gödel’s result has shown is that Leib-
niz’s dream of a system by which international peace could be established and maintained 
will not be fulfilled in a singularly mathematical manner; it does not preclude the possi-
bility that Leibniz’s goal might be achieved in some other fashion:  
Gödel’s theorem, far from undermining the project of Principia, provided its culminating 
achievement and glory, by showing that mechanical decidability, the mere grinding out, of 
significant mathematical proofs is impossible. Unaided computers, for instance, will never be 
able to prove (or disprove) weighty mathematical theorems, no more than ruler and compass 
will be able to trisect angles. (Sokol 1995: 1054) 
If anything, Gödel’s theorem should leave us uncertain as to the pragmatic status of 
mathematical problem solving. Along with the efforts of Frege and Russell, Gödel’s theo-
rem shows us that we would be well advised to maintain diligence and rigor in any analy-
sis of argumentation and in the resolution of disputes, even—and perhaps especially—if 
no mathematical ‘autopilot’ exists for the resolution of disagreements. This very fact of 
knowing that mathematical reasoning may be insufficient for the successful resolution of 
disputes is incredibly significant, and recommends the investigation of other, more social-
ly and contextually robust, forms of analysis and reasoning. At core, an explanation using 
these semantics does not differ significantly from the mathematical and scientific idea 
that negative and positive results can be of equal value. It may be the case, however, that 
these semantics are able to communicate the efforts of formal logicians and the result 
found by Gödel with greater explanatory power. 
 Let us remain sceptical, though, and proceed with care, so as to ensure that the 
use of these semantics does not easily result in the abuse of Gödel’s theorem. With these 
semantics, let us hypothesize three highly generalized possible scenarios in which we 
might consider the immediate comprehensibility of likely and potential implications for 
our socio-political view of formal logic. First, suppose that a system of peacemaking and 
dispute-resolution such as the one envisioned by Leibniz has in fact become a reality. In 
this scenario, every individual might have a handheld device with an ‘app’ for the near-
instantaneous resolution of all matters of disputes, philosophical or otherwise. In a se-
cond, far more negative situation, we hypothesize that a fundamental meta-theorem im-
pacting all areas of human activity and thought has proven beyond any doubt that all sys-
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tems of dispute-resolution are doomed to failure. In a third, neutral situation, we can im-
agine that a theorem specific to one field of human inquiry has strongly suggested that a 
particular mode of human activity might not be able to provide a concrete, failsafe system 
for the resolution of disputes, but that other modes of human activity might still be used 
to achieve peace and prosperity. By analogy, it seems that the second, negative scenario 
has thus far been the most common interpretation of Gödel’s result. However, this nega-
tive scenario is not supported by our intuitions: personal experience readily suggests that 
most people are clearly able to use systems—such as computers—to solve problems. The 
positive situation, too, finds little in the way of empirical support: it is uncontroversial 
that people do not have portable handheld applications that are capable of resolving all 
problems; indeed, our lives are riddled with ongoing disputes. The third scenario, then, 
seems to not only best describe Gödel’s result, but also appears to be the only intuitively 
appealing option in terms of real-world practice. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Abandoning an ahistorical view of formal logic encourages the consideration of socio-
political motivations in the study of notable logicians and their works. Such studies per-
mit the usage of a new set of socially germane semantics, which may allow the efforts of 
formal logicians to be more accurately communicated to non-logicians. The value of a 
socially, historically, and contextually situated view of formal logic may be contested. 
However, it seems naïve to ignore the many social factors that motivated various devel-
opments in the works and goals of formal logicians. As Toulmin suggests, Leibniz might 
well have devised his characteristica in order to address deeply troubling social concerns. 
It seems clear, too, that such social concerns fall out of sight in the work of Frege and 
Russell, whose aspirations for logic shifted towards those abstract and decontextualized 
goals with which we are now so familiar. But Russell and Frege need not have offered 
explicit endorsements regarding the pragmatic values of their works in order for us to 
acknowledge their social and real-world applications. Even intensely abstract and seem-
ingly asocial efforts are of social consequence: consider the physicists of the Manhattan 
Project, whose protracted unawareness of the profound and inescapable implications of 
their work did not lessen the real-world impact of atomic weapons. 
 Formal logicians may experience some measure of discomfort with the present-
ed view of formal logic as an effort of socio-political dispute resolution. They may prefer 
to preserve a pure view of their field of study, and maintain that their goals for formal 
logic transcend context. If, in time, it becomes apparent that viewing formal logic as a 
socially situated and pragmatic activity will allow other academics to have a more accu-
rate—and more positive—view of formal logic, then perhaps such semantics will curry 
favour with formal logicians. For philosophers concerned with argumentation theory and 
the development of critical thinking skills—i.e., those subfields broadly regarded as ‘in-
formal logic’—such an account recommends a more positive view of the history of for-
mal logic, as well as the herculean efforts of formal logicians. At core, the idea of seeing 
formal logic as an effort in dispute-resolution is not at odds with the values of ‘informal’ 
practitioners. In conclusion, we may therefore be mindful that formal and informal practi-
tioners share many of the same goals, and that, if these groups disagree, it is perhaps 
mainly in their opinions regarding how those goals might be reached.  
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I am grateful to the organizers for giving me the opportunity to reply to William Brooke’s 
scholarly and thought-provoking paper. Brooke traces the influence of Leibniz’s concept of 
a universal language and mechanical system of rational dispute resolution, the characteris-
tica universalis, to Frege and Russell, and ultimately to Gödel. Gödel’s incompleteness re-
sults are often, but erroneously, seen as exploding Leibniz’s project. Brooke argues that 
they only have this effect if the characteristica universalis is understood in formal, mathe-
matical terms. He contends that an informal characteristica universalis—a source of dis-
pute resolution through non-mathematical means—is still open to us; and as informal logi-
cians we should be well placed to take up where Leibniz left off. This narrative has conse-
quences in several fields. I shall concentrate on three: politics, mathematics, and logic. 
2. POLITICS  
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was born in 1646, two years before the end of the Thirty Years 
War, by far the most destructive European conflict prior to the twentieth century. Through-
out his life he was an indefatigable diplomatist. The pursuit of peace is, as Brooke ob-
serves, an unsurprising priority for his philosophical work. The means by which he thought 
it could be achieved, a system of reasoning in which all controversies might be resolved by 
mechanical means, is surprising. Nonetheless, Brooke follows Toulmin in arguing persua-
sively that these social concerns were the key motivation for Leibniz’s logical work. 
 Bertrand Russell’s work in logic far surpassed that of Leibniz in technical so-
phistication. And Russell is also remembered as an outspoken advocate of peace, from his 
pacifism in World War I, to his advocacy of nuclear disarmament. However, as Brooke 
notes, ‘Russell is not recalled for any insistence that some socially pragmatic value might 
be attached to his efforts in logic, and, most certainly, not in the sense suggested by Leib-
niz’ (Brooke 2011: 3). Indeed, Russell is scathing about the prospects for the characteris-
tica universalis, ascribing to Leibniz a fundamental confusion about the location of philo-
sophical problems: 
For the business of philosophy is just the discovery of those simple notions, and those primi-
tive axioms, upon which any calculus or science must be based. … And thus Leibniz sup-
posed that the great requisite was a convenient method of deduction. Whereas, in fact, the 
problems of philosophy should be anterior to deduction. (Russell 1900: 201) 
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Thus, for Russell, the hard problem of philosophy is finding the right principles; reasoning 
from these principles is easy by comparison. Russell’s position is echoed by John Woods in 
his identification of Philosophy’s Most Difficult Problem: ‘that of adjudicating in a princi-
pled way the conflict between supposing that [a valid argument] is a sound demonstration 
of a counterintuitive truth, as opposed to seeing it as a counterexample of its premisses’ 
(Woods 2003: 14). This problem remains, and remains difficult, no matter what progress 
we make in realizing Leibniz’s characteristica universalis, whether formally or informally. 
 Nonetheless, Russell does acknowledge the practical utility of informal reason-
ing. For example, in a letter published in the February 16th, 1941 edition of the New York 
Times, Russell offered a closely reasoned explanation for his support for the British war 
effort, and argued that the United States should enter World War II. In the course of his 
argument, he reflects upon the style of reasoning it employs: 
The whole argument, either way, is necessarily based on hypotheses and probabilities, as to 
which no certainty is possible; but as immediate decisions are forced upon us, we have to act 
upon such data as can be obtained, knowing that even the most careful consideration may 
lead us astray. (Russell 2002: 182) 
Hence, although Russell may have seen no application for his own formal logic in arguments 
over war and peace, he does acknowledge a role for what we now call informal logic. 
 The famously unworldly Kurt Gödel had little interest in politics. However, he 
was more sanguine about the prospects for the characteristica universalis than Russell. 
Indeed, he seems to have believed that Leibniz had actually perfected the scheme: 
But there is no need to give up hope. Leibniz did not in his writings about the Characteristica 
universalis speak of a utopian project; if we are to believe his words he had developed this 
calculus of reasoning to a large extent, but was waiting with its publication till the seed could 
fall on fertile ground. (Gödel 1944: 152 f.) 
Taken literally, as Martin Davis notes, this seems quite mad: Leibniz’s logic is not re-
motely sophisticated enough to accomplish this goal (Davis 2000: 134). However, Gö-
del’s interest in the characteristica universalis does seem to have been restricted to its 
mathematical workings, rather than its political ambitions. It is the relationship between 
Gödel’s own mathematical work, specifically his incompleteness results, and Leibniz’s 
project that most concerns Brooke. 
3. MATHEMATICS 
Gödel’s incompleteness results are of profound importance, but precisely stating that im-
portance can be a challenge. Brooke rightly deprecates the ‘application of a misunder-
stood rendition of Gödel’s result to subjects beyond the realm of mathematics’, and ob-
serves that there is a great temptation to ‘make too much of Gödel’s result, and, in so do-
ing, run the risk of excessively devaluing the importance of formal logic’ (Brooke 2011: 
4). As Jon Barwise put it, ‘Karl Marx is supposed to have said, “Every time the train of 
history goes around a corner, the thinkers fall off.” Gödel’s Theorem was a very sharp 
corner on the logic line’ (Barwise 1981: 99). Brooke itemizes some of the logic line’s 
more accident prone passengers. But this sort of critique is infectious. Brooke tells us that 
‘what Gödel’s result has shown is that Leibniz’s dream of a system by which internation-




manner’ (Brooke 2011: 5). While international peace may be unattainable for many rea-
sons, Gödel’s result does not strictly place the characteristica universalis beyond the 
scope of mathematics, but rather of any single formal system within mathematics. As 
Martin Davis summarizes, 
Gödel’s incompleteness theorem shows that ... [f]or any specific given formalism there are 
mathematical questions that will transcend it. On the other hand, in principle, each such ques-
tion leads to a more powerful system which enables the resolution of that question. One envi-
sions hierarchies of ever more powerful systems each making it possible to decide questions 
left undecidable by weaker systems. (Davis 2000: 124) 
On this picture, mathematics is unbounded, but at the expense of outgrowing every for-
mal system. As Raymond Smullyan concludes, 
In the prophetic words of the logician Post, this means that mathematics is, and must remain, 
essentially creative. Or, as commented by the mathematician Rosenbloom, it means that man 
can never eliminate the necessity of using his own intelligence, regardless of how cleverly he 
tries. (Smullyan 2001: 88) 
In other words, mathematics can never fully transcend its informal aspects. This suggests 
that the study of informal reasoning should play an indispensable role in the analysis of 
mathematical practice (as I have argued elsewhere, for other reasons: see, for example, 
Aberdein 2009). 
4. LOGIC 
Brooke concludes with the salutary reminder ‘that formal and informal practitioners share 
many of the same goals, and that, if we disagree, it is mainly in our opinions regarding 
how those goals might be reached’ (Brooke 2011: 5). I want to conclude with a few 
words about the nature of that disagreement. Elsewhere I have characterized the broader 
context required for a system of logic to be advocated as applicable to natural argumenta-
tion as a logical theory, a quadruple comprising  
 
system, parsing theory, inferential goal, background theories 
 
(Aberdein and Read 2009: 618; cf. Thagard 1982: 37). Each of these components needs a 
little explication. The system comprises the syntax, semantics, and metatheory of the logic, 
or whatever other such details its presentation requires. The parsing theory consists of a 
method for translating between the system and natural, unsystematized usage. The inferen-
tial goal determines what the use of this logic is intended to achieve and what its valid in-
ferences are expected to preserve. The background theories are broader philosophical or psy-
chological theories which inform the choices made in putting together the rest of the theory. 
 This account gives rise to a hierarchy of moves by which a logical theory may be 
revised in response to a problem: 
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 I Indifference;  
 II Non-revisionary responses: 
  (a) Delimitation of the subject matter of logic;  
  (b) Novel paraphrase; 
  (c) Semantic innovation;  
 III Conservatively revisionary responses;  
 IV Non-conservatively revisionary responses: 
  (a) Restriction of the logic; 
  (b) Wholesale revision;  
 V Change of subject matter  
  
 (cf. Aberdein and Read 2009: 635). 
 
Brooke draws attention to a problem which became increasingly acute for formal logic in 
the mid-twentieth century: its inability to contribute significantly to such applied prob-
lems as socio-political dispute resolution. One response was the development of argu-
mentation theory by such pioneers as Toulmin and Perelman. In terms of the above hier-
archy, this exemplifies the last and most radical of these moves: a change of subject mat-
ter. This occurs when a change of inferential goal is ‘precipitated by a non-conservative 
revision of the background theories. Typically this will alter the motivation of the whole 
logical enterprise, move the problem into a different area, and change the subject matter 
of logic’ (Aberdein and Read 2009: 640). This coincides with, for example, the stance of 
Ralph Johnson and Tony Blair, who ‘distinguish informal logic from formal logic, not 
only by methodology but also by its focal point ... the cogency of the support that reasons 
provide for the conclusions they are supposed to back up’ (Johnson and Blair 1997: 161). 
In my terminology this focal point is the inferential goal. A different response emerged 
somewhat later with the development of systems of non-classical formal logic, such as 
non-monotonic logic, which were better adapted to the vicissitudes of natural argumenta-
tion. These systems exemplify the previous level of the hierarchy: wholesale, non-
conservative revision of the system, accompanied by appropriate adaptations to the rest of 
the logical theory. For several decades these two responses to the same problem proceed-
ed independently, and indeed, in apparent ignorance of each other. But more recently, we 
have begun to see a rapprochement between the two. It is perhaps in such hybridization 
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